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This research identifies the information/data required to perform a safety 
assessment for large-scale systems integration. From these required safety-related 
information/data, and the utilization of system engineering processes and practices, a 
safety assessment architecture is developed. As a result, the risk of known hazards is 
mitigated to as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) and the system health of these 
large-scale system integrations is improved throughout the system’s life cycle. 
The thesis first identifies the current gap in system safety assessment for large-
scale system integrations, especially in the area of Commercial of the Shelf (COTS) and 
Non-Developmental Item (NDI) systems integration. Next, with reference to the DoD 
system life cycle process, a COTS/NDI system integration life cycle process model is 
proposed. In addition, in line with the DoD policy to have a joint weapon system safety 
review board, a system safety functional hierarchy is then created. Using the functional 
hierarchy created, more detailed sub-functions and measures of effectiveness for system 
safety assessment are then analyzed. 
Finally, a hazard list table is proposed as a tool to be used in relation to the system 
safety assessment functional hierarchy so as to achieve the objective to identify, mitigate, 
trace and accept all residual risks associated with the large-scale system integration 
throughout its life cycle. A case example of the Harpoon Weapon System (HWS) safety 
assessment on a ship platform is used to further explain the usage and process of 
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Ideally, end users would be involved in all phases (from development to 
operation) of their systems such that a thorough safety assessment can be performed and 
associated hazard risks tracked through the systems’ life cycle. However, a majority of 
countries rely on the defense market (Foreign Military Sales [FMS] or commercial off-
the-shelf [COTS]) to acquire proven systems and then perform certain levels of 
adaptation in order to integrate these COTS systems with their combat platforms.   
As a result, the safety assessment for such COTS or Non Developmental Items 
(NDI) systems installation onboard various types of combat platforms is usually 
performed without consideration of overall integration of the system with the major 
combat platform. As the complexity of system integrations increases, there is an 
increasing need for system architecture to be developed in order to consolidate the 
various standalone safety assessments and then identify the overall hazard risks 
associated with their corresponding mitigation factors for such large-scale systems 
integration.  The development of safety systems architecture is the focus of this thesis.  
Using a case example of the Harpoon Weapon System integration on a foreign 
armed forces’ combat platform, the following gaps were identified when conducting 
safety assessment for large-scale system integrations: 
a. Most end users (i.e., foreign armed forces) could only obtain safety 
assessments for a standalone weapon system and are not able to address 
the overall assessment of an integrated system to achieve their needed 
capability.  
b. As the complexity of system integrations increased, changes or upgrades 
being done in one system will affect the overall system safety and there 
will be a need to review the entire system safety assessment. There is 
currently no identified process that could allow tracking and monitoring of 
all changes in large-scale system integrations. 
c. The rapid and more organized threat emergence in recent years has led to 
the constant review of each nation’s concept of operations (CONOPS), 
directly affecting how systems are to be operated, which leads to the 




While the main benefit of COTS acquisition is savings on research and 
development costs and risk reduction associated with new development, it poses other 
challenges and pitfalls.  These include limited changes to the basic design and changes 
not controlled by the end user. COTS further limits the end user in obtaining information 
about the developmental phases and hence may not allow full awareness of the problems 
identified and methodology to resolve them. 
The system life cycle process model for a large-scale systems integration is seen 
in Figure 1. Most foreign armed forces obtained their systems in milestone B; this 
essentially means that about one-third of the system safety information resided in the 
OEM or that most of the time this information is non-releasable due to classification 
restriction (i.e., security and economics aspects).  In summary, the system safety 
assessment of large-scale systems integration can be broken into the following areas of 
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 Safety to Interfacing Platform – This should cover system safety in 
relation to the interfacing platform on which all the systems are to be 
operated.  
 Safety to Personnel – This concentrates on the day-to-day handling and 
operation of the systems by trained operators.  
 Safety Template Optimization – When there are two or more integrated 
weapon systems, there is high possibility of overlapping weapon damage 
areas or violation of weapon safety templates of boundaries. In general, 
the safety template for each weapon or missile is generated based on its 
associated guidance error, other environmental and weapon system 
consideration and certain assumptions on the area of operations for the 
country of origin.  
In order to formulate an integrated system safety assessment, it is important to 
first describe the essential functions that are required to fulfill this object. Figure 2 
depicts the proposed four main functions critical to a large-scale systems safety 
assessment. Finally, a case example of the Harpoon Weapon System (HWS) safety 
assessment on a ship platform is used to further explained the usage and process of 
generating, maintaining and tracking the hazard list table. 
 Large-scale Systems Integration Safety Assessment 
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Figure 2.   System Safety Assessment Functional Hierarchy 
 
a. Identify – This represents the ability to consolidate, clarify and classify all 
risks and hazards within the large-scale systems, where much of the data 
collection and consolidation of different system safety reports from the 
various sub-systems within the large-scale systems architecture is 





report and basis of their safety hazards should be conducted so that the 
team will be able to understand the assumptions taken in deriving the 
residual risks.  
b. Mitigate – This seeks to brainstorm and formulate all possible mitigation 
factors in order to reduce these hazards to “as low as practically 
reasonable.” This is a highly iterative process and involves various SMEs 
and the tight coordination of the Integrated Program Management Team 
(IPMT).  
c. Create Traceability – From the test cases formulated in the Mitigate 
function, a database or table of identified risks, described as a Hazard 
Listing, and its associated mitigation measures should then be created, 
maintained and tracked conscientiously throughout this whole process. 
Information in this database should include details such as description of 
risk, source of risk, affected interfacing systems, initial risk level, 
consequences, mitigation measures and mitigated/residual risk level. 
d. Gain Acceptance – This involves reviewing the residual/mitigated risk 
and appraising all stakeholders on the acceptance of all safety hazards 
associated with the large-scale systems integration. In addition to the 
Hazard Listing, a risk assessment matrix should also be developed to 
better represent the associated residual risks in relation to the probability 
of occurrence, which is dependent on the concept of operations. 
In summarizing the findings gathered in this research, the following guideline 
and/or checklist attempts to provide a quick overview and template necessary in order to 
kick-start the system safety assessment: 
a. Determining the Lead System Safety Assessment (aka System 
Integrator) - In order to fulfill the need for a joint weapon safety 
oversight, it is important first to identify which sub-system within the 
large-scale systems will be the lead system. Generally, in most cases the 
logical candidate for the lead system is the weapon system, if it is the only 
weapon system within the large-scale systems integration, due to its 
greater risk exposures with higher hazard consequences. 
b. Review of Safety Assessment Matrices - Due to the complexity of the 
large-scale systems integration of COTS/NDI, there could be a possibility 
that the Probability of Occurrence in the safety matrix of all the systems 
could be different and thus need to be reconciled into a standardized 








c. Incorporating Adequate Testing for all Safety Critical Events - Once 
the initial table of hazard lists is generated, it is appropriate to begin 
preparing and formulating the test plan for all safety critical events 
identified. The main mitigation factor for ensuring safety for COTS/NDI 
systems is to plan and perform more testing before system fielding and 
operation.  
This thesis identified the current gap as well as the information/data required in 
system safety assessment for large-scale system integrations, especially in the area of 
COTS and NDI systems integration.  From these required safety-related information/data, 
and the utilization of system engineering processes and practices, a safety assessment 
architecture is developed. The Hazard List Table format proposed is a useful tool and 
provides the necessary information and details necessary whenever required at any phase 
of the large-scale systems life cycle. As a result, the risk of known hazards is mitigated to 
as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) and the system health of these large-scale 








I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The ideal situation for most end users is to be involved in all phases (from 
development to operational launch) of their systems such that a thorough safety 
assessment can be performed and the associated hazard risks tracked through the 
systems’ life cycle. With the exception of a handful of technologically-advanced 
countries with the capability of developing in-house weapon or sensor systems, not many 
countries have the capacity as well as the technical expertise to realize this situation. The 
majority of countries have to rely heavily on the defense market (via Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)) to acquire proven systems and then 
perform some level of adaptation and interface in order to integrate these COTS systems 
into their combat platforms, such as aircraft or warships, in their bid to build-up a 
deterrent force.   
As a result, the safety assessment for such COTS systems installation aboard 
various types of combat platforms is usually performed without consideration of overall 
integration of the system with the major combat platform. In most instances, the safety 
assessment of the standalone weapon or sensor system will be provided as part of the 
procurement deliverables to the end users. It is then the responsibility of the system 
integrator of that particular combat platform to perform the overall safety assessment of 
the integrated system. 
Therefore, this is analogous to having different types of weapon and sensor 
systems within the large-scale systems integration with their own standalone safety 
assessment performed. Hence, as the complexity of system integrations increases to 
achieve certain capability needs, there is an increasing need for system architecture to be 
developed in order to consolidate the various standalone safety assessments. Then one 
can identify the overall hazard risks and their corresponding mitigation factors for such 




B. OBJECTIVE AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This research seeks to first identify the information/data required for performing a 
safety assessment for large-scale systems integration. From these required safety-related 
information/data, and adopting system engineering processes and practices, a safety 
assessment architecture can be developed. As a result, the risk of known hazards will be 
mitigated to as much as possible and the system health of these large-scale system 
integrations improved throughout their life cycle.  
In addition, this research attempts to provide more insight on a holistic analytical 
and systematic process of performing safety assessment for large-scale systems 
integrations. This enables the safety-related data to be identified upfront in the system 
definition phase, progressively traced through the development to implementation phases 
and finally periodically tracked during the systems’ operational cycles.   
C. METHODOLOGY AND SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE ADOPTED 
1. System Architecture Overview 
There are several definitions and research areas with regard to system 
architecture, most notably from well-known authors in this field. Andrew P. Sage and 
James E. Armstrong [1] state that architecture is the scheme of arrangements of the 
components of a system, and that it describes features that are repeated throughout the 
design and explains the relationship among the system’s parts. 
Another definition of architecture suggested by Dennis M. Buede [2] includes 
certain similarities and expansions in detail of the earlier architecture definitions 
proposed by Sage and Armstrong. Buede further described that an analytical system 
engineering process begins with an operational concept and includes the development of 
three separate architectures (functional, physical and operational) as part of this 























Figure 3.   Architecture Development in System Engineering Process 
 
The functional architecture defines what the system must do and the system’s 
functions and the data that flows between the functions. The physical architecture 
represents the partitioning of physical resources available to perform the system’s 
functions. Finally, the operational architecture is the mapping of functions to resources in 
a manner that is suitable for discrete-event simulation of the system’s functions. In fact, 
the operational architecture is closely linked to the operational concept (CONOPS), 
which involves doctrines as well as operating procedures specific to a particular combat 
platform or even specific to a particular military force structure (i.e., foreign navy, army 
or air force). 
With the various definitions of system architecture proposed above, the 
fundamental question of when to perform a system safety assessment first requires 
agreement on what constitutes a ‘system’. Only if we can accurately identify the system 
decomposition, in terms of its functional and physical properties (in addition to its 
operational concept), can our safety assessment of that system be complete and thorough. 
Similarly, this concept can be extended to large-scale systems in order to achieve the 
required capability (i.e., Capability-based System). 
The remaining portion of this chapter focuses on the methodology and approach 
in identifying the architecture needed to perform a detailed system safety assessment for 
large-scale system integration. 
 
 
2. Research Methodology 
The system design methodology adopted for this research study will be primarily 
based on the system architecture presented by Dennis M. Buede [2]. Using the three 
baseline categories, throughout the research study, a case example of Surface-to-Surface 
(SSM) Missile Weapon System (Harpoon) is adopted to analyze and identify the required 
information/data for performing a safety assessment of this weapon system to be made 
operational aboard a warship. An example of a generic SSM system architecture on a 













































Figure 4.   An Example of a Generic SSM System Architecture 
 
Referring to Figure 4, the blocks that are highlighted in blue refer to a standalone 
system from the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).  However, from the 
standpoint of an end user (i.e., U.S. or foreign Navy), the Harpoon Weapon System is an 
integral part of the SSM system on her warships (or other combat platforms). As a 
standalone system, it does not fulfill the required capability of a Surface-to-Surface 
Missile System if it does not have capable search radar as well as a versatile Command 
and Control (C2) system that is able to prioritize all surface threats in theater and then 
designate the necessary engagement orders. 
The architecture presented in Figure 4, as well as the brief operational concept 




addition, it shows the distinctly different perspective of a system definition both from an 
OEM as well as an end user standpoint. This difference in system definition standpoint 
thus leads the author of this thesis to the different viewpoint of performing a system 
safety assessment. 
From a weapon system OEM viewpoint, their system safety assessment focuses 
mainly on safety critical faults (i.e., inadvertent launch or misfire/hang-fire situations) 
that will limit or prevent the system from achieving its capability. There were potentially 
several assumptions made in OEM safety assessment, which may in turn also indirectly 
limit their responsibility in ensuring overall system safety installed onto a combat 
platform. For example, as most C2 systems are uniquely developed by each individual 
nation, the communication network/interface is not completely made known to the 
weapon system OEM. Hence, in order to reduce/mitigate the risk of an inadvertent 
launch, it is essential that the engagement order from C2 is sent correctly and accurately 
to the weapon system. 
Based on the example described above, the immediate question raised will be 
whose responsibility it is to ensure the engagement order is sent correctly. The weapon 
system OEM could argue that, for his weapon to operate safely, a correct engagement 
order has to be received. However, from the standpoint of the end user, the correct 
engagement order should be checked on both ends (i.e., as sent out by the C2 system and 
received by the weapon system). Depending on the level and depth of interface that the 
weapon system has with the C2 system, this argument of whose responsibility it is to 
ensure the integrity of critical messages/orders from one party to another will continue. 
To some extent, it may affect the successful conduct of a system safety assessment in its 
entirety. 
3. Research Focus Areas 
Considering the above brief description of one typical system integration 
problem, and based on the proposed system architecture described by Buede in Figure 3, 
the safety assessment architecture for large-scale system integration can be broadly 




a. Design considerations, development and qualification test results/data, 
past track records, safety program adopted, safety requirements 
identification and allocation, hazard/risk analysis and design verification 
process  (i.e., functional safety) 
b. Safety to as well as between interfacing platforms, safety to personnel 
handling the weapon system (i.e., physical safety) 
c. Weapon Safety template, Fleet doctrines and operating procedures, 
preventive and corrective maintenance schedule (i.e., operational safety) 
The general SSM architecture shown in Figure 4 and the example of interfacing a 
Harpoon Weapon System on a navy platform will be referenced again in the following 
chapters to explain certain key points, as well as to highlight certain proposed 
improvements on where system safety assessment could be implemented. 
Finally, from the information/data gathered in the above areas of research, a 
template for hazard/risk analysis could be developed for traceability. In addition, the key 
areas in the SE process will also be identified such that these safety-related 
information/tasks could be systematically obtained, gathered and maintained through the 





II. OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
A.  SYSTEM SAFETY IN DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
1. Emergence of System Safety Program 
System safety itself arose out of ballistic missile programs in the 1950s [5], when 
the Atlas and Titan ICBMs were being developed; intense political pressure was focused 
on building a nuclear warhead with delivery capability as a deterrent to nuclear war. In 
these first missile system projects, system safety was not identified and assigned as a 
specific responsibility. Instead, as was usual at the time, each designer, manager, and 
engineer was assigned responsibility for safety. These projects, however, involved 
advanced technology and much greater complexity than had previously been attempted, 
and the drawbacks of the standard approach to safety became clear when many interface 
problems went unnoticed until it was too late.    
Within 18 months after the fleet of 71 Atlas F missiles became operational, four 
blew up in their silos during operational testing. The missiles also had an extremely low 
launch success rate. Not only were the losses themselves costly, but the resulting 
investigations detected serious safety deficiencies in the system that would require 
extensive modifications to correct. In fact, the cost of the modifications would have been 
so high that a decision was made to retire the entire weapon system and accelerate 
deployment of the Minuteman missile system [3]. 
When the early aerospace accidents were investigated, it became apparent that the 
causes of a large percentage of them could be traced to deficiencies in design, operations, 
and management. The previous “fly–fix–fly” approach was clearly not adequate. In this 
approach, investigations were conducted to reconstruct the causes of accidents, action 
was taken to prevent or minimize the recurrence of accidents with the same cause, and 
eventually these preventive actions were incorporated into standards, codes of practice, 
and regulations. Although the fly–fix–fly approach was effective in reducing the 
repetition of accidents with identical causes, it became clear to the Department of 




weapons, unacceptable to prevent accidents only after they occur a first time. This 
realization led to the adoption of system safety approaches to try to prevent accidents 
before they happen. 
The first military specification on system safety was published by the U.S. Air 
Force (Ballistic Systems Division) in 1962, and the Minuteman ICBM became the first 
weapon system to have a contractual, formal, disciplined system safety program. From 
that time on, system safety received increasing attention, especially in Air Force missile 
programs where testing was limited and accident consequences were serious. The U.S. 
Army soon adopted system safety programs because of the many personnel it was losing 
in helicopter accidents, and the U.S. Navy followed suit. In 1966, the DoD issued a single 
directive requiring system safety programs on all development or modification contracts. 
At first, there were few techniques that could be used on these complex defense 
systems. But, step by step, the specialized safety engineering and operational safety 
practices that had evolved over the years were integrated with scientific, technical, and 
management techniques that were newly developed or adapted from other activities. 
Particular emphasis was placed on hazard analysis techniques, such as fault trees, which 
were first developed to cope with complex programs such as Minuteman. 
2. Definition of System Safety 
System safety uses systems theory and system engineering approaches to prevent 
foreseeable accidents and to minimize the results of unforeseen ones. Losses in general, 
not just human death or injury are considered. Such losses may include destruction of 
property, loss of mission, and environmental harm. The primary concern of system safety 
is the management of hazards: their identification, evaluation, elimination, and control 
through analysis, design and management procedures. Mueller, in 1968, described the 
then new discipline of system safety engineering as “organized common sense” [4]. 
System safety is a planned, disciplined, and systematic approach to identifying, 
analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of a system (Figure 5 shows 
the system life cycle model as defined in DoD 5000) in order to prevent or reduce 
accidents. System safety activities start in the earliest concept development stages of a 
 
 
project and continue through design, production, testing, operational use, and disposal. 
One aspect that distinguishes system safety from other approaches to safety is its primary 
emphasis on the early identification and classification of hazards so that corrective action 




Figure 5.   DoD System Life Cycle Model (From: [21]) 
 
System safety is more than just system engineering. Essentially, system safety 
engineering is an important part of system safety, but the concerns of system safety 
extend beyond the traditional boundaries of engineering. In 1968, Jerome Lederer, then 
the director of the NASA Manned Flight Safety Program for Apollo wrote [5]: 
System safety covers the total spectrum of risk management. It goes 
beyond the hardware and associated procedures of system safety 
engineering. It involves attitudes and motivation of designers and 
production people, employee/management rapport, the relation of 
industrial associations among themselves and with government, human 
factors in supervision and quality control, documentation on the interfaces 
of industrial and public safety with design and operations, the interest and 
attitudes of top management, the effects of the legal system on accident 
investigations and exchange of information, the certification of critical 
workers, political considerations, resources, public sentiment and many 
other non-technical but vital influences on the attainment of an acceptable 
level of risk control. These nontechnical aspects of system safety cannot 
be ignored. 
Using these general principles, system safety attempts to manage hazards through 
analysis, design, and management procedures. Key activities include top-down system 
hazard analyses (starting in the early concept design stage to eliminate or control hazards 
and continuing during the life of the system to evaluate changes in the system or the 





trails); designing to eliminate or control hazards and minimize damage, maintaining 
safety information systems and documentation; and establishing reporting and 
information channels. 
System Safety is a continuing effort and ever-increasing important task in all 
weapon systems acquisition. While it is seen as a near impossible task to achieve zero 
accidents/mishaps, the ultimate aim is to strive for reduction/mitigation of risks to as low 
as reasonably practical (ALARP). As quoted by Jerome Lederer earlier, System Safety is 
a culture that needs to be well understood and supported, especially by higher 
management. A similar memorandum sent out by the Secretary of Defense in 2003, 
stating that, “I challenge all of you to reduce the number of mishaps and accident rates by 
at least 50% in the next 2 years,” [15] clearly demonstrated the strong desire and 
paramount importance of ensuring effective and safe fighting forces. Subsequently, 
through the dissemination of this memorandum, the DoD Oversight Council (DSOC) was 
established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness [16] to 
provide governance of accident reduction efforts.  
3. System Safety Standards 
The first system safety assessment standard, MIL-STD-882, was issued in June 
1969 and a system safety program became mandatory on all DoD-procured products and 
systems. The first revision (MIL-STD-882A) was made in June 1977, focusing on the 
concept of risk acceptance as a criterion for system safety programs. The hazard 
probability and established categories for frequency of occurrence to accommodate the 
long-standing hazard severity categories was also introduced. Next, MIL-STD-882B, 
revised in March 1984, continued the evolution of detailed guidance in both engineering 
and management requirement, with more emphasis on facilities and off-the-shelf 
acquisition, while software was addressed in some detail for the first time. About three 
years later, the expanded software tasks and the scope of the treatment of software by 
system safety was included in this revision. 
In Jan 1993, the MIL-STD-882C revision included the integration of hazard and 




revision. As a result, the safety analysis would identify the hardware and software tasks 
together in a system. Under the Military Specifications and Standards Report (MSSR) 
initiative, MIL-STD-882D was considered important to continue, as long as it was 
converted to a performance-based standard practice what you want vs. how to do it. In 
this Feb 2000 revision [6], task descriptions were also removed. In summary, the MIL-
STD-882 describes eight mandatory system safety steps as follow: 
1. Document the system safety approach 
2. Identify ESOH hazards 
3. Assess the risk 
4. Identify risk mitigation measures 
5. Reduce risk to an acceptable level 
6. Verify risk reduction 
7. Review hazards and accept risk by appropriate authority 
8. Track ESOH hazards, their resolution, and residual risk throughout the 
system lifecycle  
Mishap severity categories are defined to provide a qualitative measure of the 
most reasonable credible mishap resulting from personnel error, environmental 
conditions, design inadequacies, procedural deficiencies, or system, subsystem, or 
component failure or malfunction. Suggested mishap severity categories are shown in 
Table 1. The dollar values shown in this table should be established on a system-by-









Table 1.   Suggested Mishap Severity Categories 
Description Category Environmental, Safety, and Health Result Criteria 
Catastrophic I 
Could result in death, permanent total disability, loss 
exceeding $1M, or irreversible severe environmental 
damage that violates law or regulation. 
Critical II 
Could result in permanent partial disability, injuries or 
occupational illness that may result in hospitalization 
of at least three personnel, loss exceeding $200K but 
less than $1M, or reversible environmental damage 
causing a violation of law or regulation. 
Marginal III 
Could result in injury or occupational illness resulting 
in one or more lost work days(s), loss exceeding $10K 
but less than $200K, or mitigatible environmental 
damage without violation of law or regulation where 
restoration activities can be accomplished. 
Negligible IV 
Could result in injury or illness not resulting in a lost 
work day, loss exceeding $2K but less than $10K, or 
minimal environmental damage not violating law or 
regulation. 
 
Mishap probability is the probability that a mishap will occur during the planned 
life expectancy of the system. It can be described in terms of potential occurrences per 
unit of time, events, population, items, or activity. Assigning a quantitative mishap 
probability to a potential design or procedural hazard is generally not possible early in the 
design process. At that stage, a qualitative mishap probability may be derived from 
research, analysis, and evaluation of historical safety data from similar systems. 
Supporting rationale for assigning a mishap probability is documented in hazard analysis 









Table 2.   Suggested Mishap Probability Levels 
Description Level Specific Individual Item Fleet or Inventory 
Frequent A 
Likely to occur often in the life of an 
item, with a probability of occurrence 




Will occur several times in the life of an 
item, with a probability of occurrence less 




Likely to occur some time in the life of an 
item, with a probability of occurrence less 
than 10-2 but greater than 10-3 in that life. 
Will occur several 
times 
Remote D 
Unlikely but possible to occur in the life 
of an item, with a probability of 
occurrence less than 10-3 but greater than 
10-6 in that life. 
Unlikely, but can 
reasonably be 
expected to occur 
Improbable E 
So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence 
may not be experienced, with a 
probability of occurrence less than 10-6 in 
that life. 
Unlikely to occur, 
but possible 
 
The Mishap Risk Assessment matrix is a classification by mishap severity and 
mishap probability to be performed. This assessment allows one to assign a mishap risk 
assessment value to a hazard based on its mishap severity and its mishap probability. This 
value is often used to rank different hazards as to their associated mishap risks. Table 3 
shows an example of this Risk Assessment matrix as derived from MIL-STD-882D. 
 
Table 3.   Mishap Risk Assessment Values 
Severity Frequency of 
Occurrence Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible 
Frequent 1 3 7 13 
Probable 2 5 9 16 
Occasional 4 6 11 18 
Remote 8 10 14 19 




Mishap risk assessment values are often used in grouping individual hazards 
into mishap risk categories. Mishap risk categories are then used to generate specific 
action such as mandatory reporting of certain hazards to management for action or formal 
acceptance of the associated mishap risk. Table 4 shows an example listing of mishap 
risk categories and the associated assessment values. In the example, the system 
management has determined that mishap risk assessment values 1 through 5 constitute 
“High” risk while values 6 through 9 constitute “Serious” risk. 
 
Table 4.   Mishap Risk Categories and Mishap Risk Acceptance Level 
Mishap Risk 
Assessment Value Mishap Risk Category 
Mishap Risk Acceptance 
Level 
1 – 5 High Component Acquisition Executive 
6 – 9 Serious Program Executive Officer 
10 – 17 Medium Program Manager 
18 – 20 Low As directed 
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFETY ASSESSMENT MATRIX 
1. Overview of Harpoon Weapon System 
In 1965, the U.S. Navy began studies for a missile in the 45 km (25 nm) range 
class for use against surfaced submarines. The name Harpoon was assigned to the project 
(i.e., a harpoon to kill "whales," a naval slang term for submarines). After the sinking of 
the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 by Soviet-built anti-ship missiles, the U.S. Navy saw 
the need to develop a dedicated anti-shipping missile, and therefore Harpoon's primary 
mission became surface ship attack. The development project was formally begun in 
1968, and the missile designator ZAGM-84A was allocated in 1970 after the Navy had 
issued a formal RFP (Request For Proposals). In June 1971, McDonnell Douglas was 
awarded the prime contract for Harpoon, and the first test missile flew in October 1972. 
By that time it had already been decided to develop air-launched, ship-launched 
and submarine-launched Harpoon variants, designated AGM-84A, RGM-84A and 




                                                
nm), turbojet propulsion was selected by McDonnell Douglas. Production of the Harpoon 
began in 1975, and the first version to enter service was the shipborne RGM-84A in 
1977, followed by the AGM-84A on P-3 aircraft in 1979. The UGM-84A became 
operational on attack submarines in 1981. The AN/SWG-1(V) Harpoon Ship Command 
Launch Control System (HSCLCS) is the element of the surface ship weapon system that 
prepares and launches the Harpoon cruise missile. 
The Harpoon is the only dedicated anti-ship missile in service with U.S. armed 
forces. In recent years, it has been developed into several advanced versions/variants (i.e. 
Block 1C, 1G and II), including the SLAM (Stand-off Land Attack Missile) derivatives 
for high-precision attacks on land targets. Notwithstanding, its weapon system has also 
been upgraded (to Advanced Harpoon Weapon Control System) to handle more 
sophisticated and complex network-centric integration. The Harpoon/SLAM will remain 
in service with the U.S. Navy for the foreseeable future and it remains the world’s most 
successful anti-ship missile, featuring autonomous, all-weather, over-the-horizon 
capability. As of 2008 (according to the Boeing website), more than 7,200 Harpoons have 
been produced, with about twenty-nine countries as Harpoon customers.1 
Throughout the development of the Harpoon missile and its weapon control 
system, McDonnell Douglas (a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Boeing Company) had 
maintained a consistent safety oversight program to ensure that all safety aspects of this 
weapon were addressed, monitored and mitigated. Figure 7 (page 17) shows the hazard 
risk matrix that was used in their classification of hazard risk depending on its probability 
of occurrence; the corresponding acceptance level of risk is also clearly identified. 
 
 
1 Harpoon Missiles can only be acquired via Foreign Military Sales (FMS), while its control system 
(HSCLCS or AHWCS) can be acquired either FMS or commercially through McDonnell Douglas, a 





Figure 6.   Harpoon Weapon on Different Combat Platforms (From: [22]) 
 
The most important point to note in Figure 7 is that, while the hazard severity 
category can be adapted to other foreign armed forces, the hazard probability ranking 
presented is believed to be based on a certain USN platform as well as its associated 
operational profile. This is evident as Boeing and McDonnell Douglas were the prime 
contractor during the 1970s for the USN in developing the first generation of Harpoon 
missile and weapon control system. After the first operational deployment of Harpoon, a 
full safety assessment was not performed for each subsequent variant and upgrade of the 
system (i.e., assessments only addressed the areas where the upgrades were performed). 
As the Harpoon missile and its weapon control system established a proven track 
record, it was extended to more deployments in various combat platforms. However, the 
same safety matrix in Figure 7 is being adopted for other combat platform installations. 
Similarly, though Harpoon was made available to interested allied countries of the U.S., 
most of these foreign armed forces did not have access to the overall safety assessment 





Figure 7.   Safety Assessment Matrix Adopted by The Boeing Company (From: [23]) 
 
In this section, an illustration of the development of the Harpoon and its weapon 
control system provided some indication of the complexity of safety assessment to be 
addressed for future large-scale system integrations development.  Most armed forces, 
probably including U.S. and other technology-advanced countries, would potentially 
require information on safety assessment of various sub-systems (either developed in-
house or operated by different agencies) of large integrated systems (in different combat 
platforms). As such, system safety assessment of current platform-based approach may 
not be feasible in a capability-based network-centric system required to address the ever-








C. CURRENT GAPS IN SAFETY ASSESSMENT PERFORMED 
The following shows some current gaps identified for conducting safety 
assessment for large-scale system integrations: 
a. Most end users (i.e., foreign armed forces), who do not have the capacity 
and technology to develop their own weapon systems, could only obtain 
safety assessments performed for a standalone weapon system and hence 
are not able to address the overall safety assessment of an integrated 
system in order to achieve their needed capability.  
b. As the complexity of system integrations increases, or the development of 
large-scale systems integration, changes or upgrades being done in one 
system will affect the overall system safety and hence there will be a need 
to review the entire system safety assessment. There is currently no 
identified process that could allow tracking and monitoring of all changes 
in large-scale system integrations. 
c. The rapid and more organized threat emergence in recent years has led to 
the constant review of each nation’s concept of operations (CONOPS) as 
well as doctrines. These operational changes directly affect how systems 
are to be operated, the operational profiles, which in turn leads to the 




III. SAFETY ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENT FOR LARGE-
SCALE SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
A. SYSTEM SAFETY CHALLENGES FOR NDI/COTS 
As concluded in Chapter II, one of the current gaps in safety assessment for large-
scale system integrations was the inability to address the overall safety assessment of an 
integrated system in order to achieve their needed capability. From the prospective of 
foreign armed forces, one possible reason for this gap in safety assessment is due to 
NDI/COTS purchases from established weapon system contractors and/or via 
government-agency (i.e., FMS buy). This can be further illustrated using Figure 8 with 
respect to the DoD 5000.2 system life cycle process model (recently updated in 2009), 
where NDI/COTS procurement probably occurs at milestone B. 
 
 
Figure 8.   DoD 5000.2 (2009) System Life Cycle Process Model (From: [21]) 
 
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) is the term most often used to refer to 
commercial items already developed and readily available for purchase by the 
government. The definition of Non-Developmental Item (NDI) follows a similar 
definition to that of COTS. The main benefits of NDI/COTS acquisition include savings 
on research and development costs and reduced the risk associated with new 
development. On the other hand, NDI/COTS also posed other challenges and pitfalls such 
as limited changes to the basic design and changes not controlled by the end user (i.e., 
OEM has the overall configuration control). Lastly, NDI/COTS also limits the end user in 






allow full awareness of the problems identified and methodology to resolve them; safety-
related identification and mitigation process is one type of information termed “non-
releasable” in NDI/COTS acquisition. 
With reference to the case example of procuring a Harpoon Weapon System used 
for this thesis research, most if not all foreign armed forces obtained their weapon 
systems at milestone B (refer to Figure 8) or beyond. This essentially means that about 
one-third of the system safety information resides with the original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) or most of the time this information is non-releasable due to 
classification restriction (i.e., security and economics aspects). Other potential problems 
faced when obtaining these NDI/COTS include the following: 
 Performance specifications represent developing country’s needs, threats, 
and operational environment vis-à-vis the buyers’  
 NDI-COTS System may be designed for different tactics, doctrine and 
logistic support structure (skewed toward the developing country) 
 Usually designed for different user training, skill levels, strength, culture, 
and combat environment (i.e., human factors, symbology used in man-
machine interface (MMI), anthropometric requirements, etc.) 
 Not specifically designed for interoperability or compatibility with user 
systems. 
 System modifications to meet user threats may be difficult and 
economically not feasible (i.e., re-design the whole system) 
In consideration of the above challenges and difficulties faced by most 
NDI/COTS users, it is evident that the testing and evaluation of these NDI/COTS 
components before they are installed for field use becomes of paramount importance. The 
following section will describe in detail the need for operational testing and evaluation in 
NDI/COTS procurement. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF TESTING AND EVALUATION IN SYSTEM SAFETY 
PROCESS 
With reference to the DoD 5000.2 process presented in the section above, the pre-
system acquisition phase can be described as the developmental testing and evaluation 
(DT & E) of the system. This is the initial system concept design phase and probably the 




safety-related design considerations and safety interlocks were determined here based on 
certain operational concepts and doctrines/policies put in place by the developing 
country. In addition, this DT & E phase is beyond the control of the NDI/COTS user and 
will have limited safety information associated with it. Therefore, this emphasizes the 
importance of focusing testing and evaluation at the start of milestone C, as shown in 
Figure 8, for NDI/COTS users as an alternate approach to verifying the critical safety 
design features of the system. 
The difference between DT & E and Operational Test & Evaluation (OT & E) lies 
in the scope of tests conducted in their respective phases. In DT & E, tests are in a 
controlled and repeatable environment, and the main objective of such tests is to 
demonstrate that the system performs as planned at each stage of the development and 
thus meets the intended system specifications (for example, Harpoon Weapon System 
Specifications [22]). On the other hand, OT & E focuses on evaluating a system’s 
operational effectiveness and suitability in accordance with end user doctrine and 
operating procedures. In this aspect, this phase is the most crucial phase for the end user 
to determine the robustness of the NDI/COTS in realistic operational environment (for 
example, Harpoon Weapon System Specifications [22]). Therefore, it is also in this phase 
where further system safety-related problems will be discovered (i.e., due to integration 
of several NDI/COTS components). 
As shown in Figure 9, three main domains contribute to the eventual goal of 
attaining combat effectiveness in any large-scale systems integration acquisition, namely 
Personnel & Training, Tactics & Doctrine, and Weapon Technical Performance. In 
relation to the test and evaluation phases, Weapon Technical Performance will be 
validated in the DT & E phase, which is the responsibility of the OEM. Both the 
Personnel & Training and Tactics & Doctrine will be validated through the OT & E 
phase, which is within the control of the end user. As clearly illustrated in Figure 9, each 
of the three domains has to interact with the others in order to achieve the final objective 
as indicated in the center overlapping the three domains. For example, a certain level of 
tactical training of the operators needs to be conducted in accordance with the specified 
tactics and doctrine developed by the end user. In addition, modeling and simulation 
 
 
(M&S), such as the Army’s Janus combat simulation, could be incorporated to further 
evaluate if the weapon system functions as intended in accordance with the desired 
tactics required by the user. Finally, the human factors as well as safety to operating 





Figure 9.   Combat Effectiveness In Relation To DT & E and OT & E (From: [21]) 
 
From another point of view, it can also be seen that as the system evolves through 
the various life cycle stages, more and more errors/problems surface, as shown in Figure 
10. During the requirement definition phase, requirement errors first develop that could 
be due to uncertainty in the concept of operations and usage of the system. As the system 




inherent design errors. Subsequently, in the implementation phase, these design errors 
may lead to hardware and software errors, in addition to the errors created in the earlier 
two phases. Finally, as the system reaches the testing phase, the effects of uncontrolled 
errors, such as environment conditions and random operator handling errors will become 
more significant and could make it even harder to trace and determine the source of error. 
This leads to the decision to focus on the OT & E phase as one of the mitigating factors 
in overcoming the current gap of system safety for large-scale integration. 
 
Figure 10.   Errors Increases As the System Goes Through the Life Cycle (From: [21]) 
 
C. SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE PROCESS MODEL FOR NDI/COTS 
As highlighted in the earlier section on the potential problems with regard to 
system safety faced by NDI/COTS, Figure 11 briefly shows a typical system life cycle 
process model of a NDI/COTS system. This is analogous to a large-scale systems 
integration, whereby concept of operations as well as systems requirement formulation 
are the critical parameters in this front end planning phase. The key difference here in 
comparison with the DoD System Life Cycle Process model (shown in Figure 8) can be 




As briefly described in Chapter II, the Harpoon Weapon System was developed to 
counter a threat identified by the U.S. Navy in 1965; hence, this defined the concept of 
operation for the Harpoon Weapon System. In today’s context, from the perspective of a 
current FMS customer, the concept of operation for a Surface-to-Surface Weapon System 
during the front end planning phase is likely to be different than the U.S. Navy Harpoon 
CONOPS. The Harpoon Weapon System may be just one of the many potential systems 
available on the market to be considered as part of the customer’s overall CONOPS 
during the front end planning phase. 
As the FMS customer becomes clearer on her concept of operations, the required 
systems to meet her needs will then be defined, which will lead into the next phase 
known as systems acquisition management. Depending on the nature and organizational 
structure of the FMS customers, their required systems may be procured under a main 
contract or be broken down into several sub-systems’ contracts. Again, this is similar to 
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It is becoming more and more complex (for a single contractor) as well as 
economically not feasible to have a large enough budget and time to achieve the full 
operational capability of a large-scale systems integration. As such, systems are procured 
and then made operational in phases before they are finally put together to achieve the 
integrated operational capability desired. Similarly, this process flow of a large-scale 
systems integration life cycle fits in perfectly to the process model as shown in Figure 11. 
D. IMPORTANCE OF A SYSTEM INTEGRATOR (SI) AND INTEGRATED 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT TEAM (IPMT) 
It is without doubt that the successful implementations of a large-scale systems 
integration requires not just various subject matter experts (SMEs), but also an overall 
System Integrator (SI) serving as the first important piece of the puzzle to a successful 
overall safety assessment. The role of the SI can be defined as follow: 
a. Understand the overall CONOPS required and the role each system plays 
in a large-scale systems integration 
b. Meet the intended IOC/FOC milestones for the overall large-scale systems 
integration in consideration of the various sub-systems’ contracts and their 
respective schedules  
c. Serve as possible interfacing link between the end user, various 
contractors and SMEs 
d. Resolve critical integration issues throughout the life cycle process 
e. Provide timely update on progress to management and end user 
As described above, the role and responsibility of the SI is enormous; it requires 
not a single person but a dedicated team that can cover the various aspects of the large-
scale systems integration problems. This leads to the second recommendation of forming 
an IPMT, which comprises mainly the different systems to be procured within the large-
scale systems integration. This approach will help in breaking down the more complex 
higher-level problems into various sub-areas whereby interface/integrating issues can be 
localized and resolved completely. Regular integration reviews, led by the SI, should be 
conducted to keep track of all problems, be they solved or outstanding. This is essential 
in the subsequent formulation of the overall system safety assessment. 
Last but not least, the end user should also be engaged early during the system 




eventual OT & E requirements such as scenarios, specific aspects of the integration to be 
demonstrated, etc, and then lay out the plan leading up to the final objective. A working 
group composed of the end user, the SI and the various sub-system managers is 
recommended during this phase of the system life cycle, so that all interface/integration 
issues, progress updates on the various systems and any potential technical/schedule/cost 
risks are foreseen. Nonetheless, the overall system safety assessment should also begin in 
this phase and be addressed in the working group meeting. 
E. SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENT FOCUS 
The system life cycle process model for a large-scale systems integration shown 
in Figure 11 defines the ‘backbone’ of the system safety architecture, which allows the 
author of this thesis to gather the essential and necessary information required for the 
analysis downstream. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, about one-third of the system 
safety information resides with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM); this is 
clearly shown in the discussion on the differences between the system life cycle adopted 
by DoD and the proposed system life cycle process model for a large-scale systems 
integration (Figure 11). The system safety assessment of large-scale systems integration 
can be broken into the following area of focus during its life cycle: 
 Safety to Interfacing Platform – This aspect looks into issues such as 
qualification tests conducted vis-à-vis interfacing platform structures, 
EMI/EMC issues, maintenance-related safety issues, etc. 
 Safety to Personnel and Operator Handling the System – This aspects 
looks into the Human-System Interface (HSI) in terms of operator risk and 
exposure to ordnance 
 Safety Template Optimization – This focuses on the safety range of 
weapon damage boundaries, ordnance and Electromagnetic and Energetic 
Devices (EEDs) 
In the following chapters, the methodology and evaluation criteria for the three 





IV. SYSTEM-OF-SYSTEM SAFETY METRICS 
A.  NEED FOR JOINT SAFETY METRICS 
The complex nature of today’s war-fighting operations has led to the emergence 
of the large-scale systems integration; similarly for system safety, especially in critical 
areas such as weapon systems, there is an increasing need to formulate an integrated 
system safety assessment. This is the reason the Defense Safety Oversight Council 
(DSOC) Acquisition and Technology Programs Task Force (ATP TF), on 21 July 2005, 
approved a proposal to streamline the weapon safety review process and chartered a Joint 
Weapon Safety Working Group to develop and refine a collaborative, defense-wide 
process for USSOCOM (United States Special Operations Command) support. As shown 
in Figure 12, weapon safety review board certifications in support of USSOCOM 
acquisition programs historically were obtained through multiple reviews by the 
respective system safety boards and organizations in each of the departments [7].  
 





The process to certify systems as safe for use by members of more than one 
Service has been to conduct individual Service system safety reviews by each of the 
Services whose members would be expected to employ those systems. While each 
individual Service has long-standing weapon safety review processes designed to meet 
their Service-unique requirements, multiple individual system safety reviews conducted 
in series by each Military Department and/or Service for a particular joint weapon or 
weapon system are expensive, time consuming and redundant. In addition, a multiple 
review board approach has the potential for conflicting safety requirements and 
recommendations resulting in inconsistent safety designs and/or operating procedures.  
Therefore, it is both prudent and logical to require that a single, integrated and 
consolidated weapon safety review and certification be conducted for each USSOCOM 
system in a coherent, collaborative manner by the respective weapon safety review 
authorities. Hence, weapon safety representatives from USSOCOM, the Army, Navy, 
Marine Corps, Air Force, Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB), and 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Acquisition Technology & 
Logistics (AT&L) coordinated the development of a Joint process that addresses Joint 
safety release and certification. This process eliminates the inefficiencies inherent in the 
existing individual Military Department and Service system safety review processes 
when examining, for safety purposes, any USSOCOM weapon system with Joint 
application. As a result, this Joint collaborative review process accelerates the fielding of 
weapon systems to the USSOCOM war-fighter without compromising safety. 
B.  PROPOSED SAFETY METRICS 
The Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC) Acquisition and Technology 
Programs (ATP) Task Force funded development of the System Safety Metrics Method 
in 2006 [10], which aims to develop a model to serve as a useful tool to gauge the health 
of a safety program at any stage of the lifecycle of the program. The proposed System 
Safety Metrics Method consists of a recommended scale (0-5), 39 inquiry items, detailed 
data collection sheets, and a means to track the data. Figure 13 shows a recommended 




Figure 13.   Proposed System Safety Metrics (From: [10]) 
 
The System Safety Metrics Method depicted above consists of: 
 Data Gathering Criteria 
 Scale 
 Table of Inquiry Items 
 Composite Index of Inquiry Items 
 Results Database (Microsoft Excel spreadsheet) 
As mentioned above, the purpose of the System Safety Metrics Method is to 
gauge the efficacy of a system safety program. To accomplish this, interviews are 
conducted with program practitioners. Answers to standardized interview questions 
provide data that are then used to profile the program. Workshop participants were a 
group of more than forty System Safety specialists from around the U.S. and abroad, 
including agencies such as DoD, NASA, the European Space Agency, several 
universities, and the FAA. The results gathered from the workshop identified three 





A draft matrix of questions then captures a set of metrics pointing toward 
excellence. Finally, the draft set of about more than 140 questions can be used to gather 
information about the current state of a system safety program or organization. As 
described in the earlier paragraph, this system safety metrics method focuses on the 
overall safety program adequacy while diminishing the importance of detailed analysis 
and traceability of safety hazards associated with the system.  
In addition, this method would truly benefit a development program whereby a 
safety program needs to be in place at the beginning of the life cycle, as shown in DoD 
5000.2 (2009) System Life Cycle Process Model. It may be less effective in assessing the 
system safety for COTS/NDI systems integration, which requires gathering and 
consolidating different system safety models and matrices generated from differing safety 
program adopted by various OEMs. 
C.  SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 
In order to formulate an integrated system safety assessment, it is important to 
first describe the essential functions that are required to fulfill this objective. Through gap 
analysis and information gathered in this thesis research, Figure 14 depicts the proposed 
four main functions critical to a large-scale systems integration safety assessment, namely 
Identify, Mitigate, Create Traceability and Gain Acceptance. The details of each function 
are described as follows:  
Large-scale Systems Integration Safety Assessment 
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Identify – The first function of system safety assessment is to have the ability to 
consolidate, clarify and classify all risks and hazards within the large-scale systems 
integration. This is the phase where much of the data collection and consolidation of 
different system safety reports from the various sub-systems within the large-scale 
systems integration architecture is conducted. Next, clarification with each sub-system’s 
OEM on their safety report and basis of their safety hazards should be conducted so that 
the team will be able to understand the assumptions taken in deriving the residual risks.  
With these clarifications, further classification of the risks could be performed so 
as to tailor the nature and complexity of the integration required as well as the concept of 
operations desired; these could potentially result in new risks or hazards being identified. 
This first function of system safety assessment is considered to be the most important and 
critical portion in the safety assessment hierarchy. The level of details and adequacy of 
mitigation factors that follow heavily depends on the amount of safety-related 
information and their associated supporting documents and references gathered from the 
individual COTS/NDI OEMs. 
Mitigate – With the identification and clarification of the list of hazards 
associated with the large-scale systems integration conducted in the earlier function, it is 
then the task of this function to brainstorm and formulate all possible mitigation factors in 
order to reduce these hazards to “as low as practically reasonable.” This function is a 
highly iterative process and involves various SMEs and the tight coordination of the 
Integrated Program Management Team (IPMT). There are two main factors, namely time 
and budget, which could potentially influence the fidelity of the proposed mitigation 
measures. For example, the end user will have a pre-determined schedule for the Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC) for their systems to be introduced into service, which the 
IPMT have to adhere to strictly. In addition, depending on the acquisition strategy 
adopted for that particular system, mitigation measures normally may relate to either 
hardware or software modifications, which may not be catered in the budget upfront.   
With the above considerations on the time and budget factors, several trade-off 
analyses could also be conducted here in order to determine the most feasible and 




creating actual tests or trials to confirm that mitigation measures are indeed effective in 
reducing the risks. Nonetheless, it is unavoidable that a certain level of testing will be 
required as part of the mitigation measures. Therefore, the IPMT also needs to look into 
the details of how to formulate and create test cases (for example, a thorough series of 
robustness and endurance tests) for these safety-related hazards so that risks are 
progressively mitigated with increasing confidence levels. 
Create Traceability – From the test cases formulated in the Mitigate function, a 
database or table of identified risks, described as a Hazard Listing, and its associated 
mitigation measures should then be created, maintained and tracked conscientiously 
throughout this whole process. Information in this database should include details such as 
description of risk, source of risk (Contributing System), affected interfacing systems, 
initial risk level, consequences, mitigation measures and mitigated/residual risk level.  
All safety-related problems observed, whether identified earlier or newly 
discovered, should be registered during all testing. These problem register log files 
should also be maintained and subsequently used in the generation of the final safety 
report. Finally, this database will be useful in providing constant updates to the higher 
management as well as the end users in terms of number of risks, overall risk level of the 
large-scale systems integration and progress updates on the mitigation measures for each 
risk. 
Gain Acceptance – This phase describes the residual/mitigated risk review and 
appraises all stakeholders on the acceptance of all safety hazards associated with the 
large-scale systems integration.  In addition to the Hazard Listing, a risk assessment 
matrix should also be developed to better represent the associated residual risks in 
relation to the probability of occurrence, which is dependent on the concept of operations. 
Therefore, command decisions and the proposed way ahead on whether the residual risks 
presented will be accepted, or further improvement on the mitigation measures, could be 
obtained in this phase. Similarly, this function is understood to be an iterative process 
depending on the criticality of the residual risks presented and the time as well as budget 
availability whereby the end users may request further mitigation measures to be in place 




This section of the thesis ends with the formulation of the functional hierarchy 
required for the system safety assessment. In the next section, the measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) in terms of key areas of focus will be identified and further 









V. KEY FOCUS AREAS FOR CONDUCTING SYSTEM SAFETY 
ASSESSMENT 
A. IDENTIFICATION OF THREE KEY AREAS OF FOCUS 
In order to achieve the desired detailed analysis on system safety, three main area 
of focus for the system safety assessment of large-scale systems integration during its life 
cycle are presented below. These three focus areas are then further broken down into 
details and information to consider for each area so that the adequacy of system safety 
assessment could be efficiently quantified. The three focus areas are:  
 Safety to Interfacing Platform  
 Safety to Personnel and Operator Handling the System 
 Safety Template Optimization 
B. SAFETY TO INTERFACING PLATFORM 
The first focus area covers system safety in relation to the interfacing platform on 
which all the systems are to be operated. All safety related issues with regard to inter-
systems operations and procedures, as well as their physical integration on these 
platforms, should be examined. In this aspect, there are generally three sub-areas on 
which to focus, namely: 
1. Operational Usage of Systems with Interfacing Platform 
This concerns safety related information on Electromagnetic 
Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) within large-scale systems 
integration (e.g., radar frequencies versus tactical and exercise missile frequencies). A 
common reference to be adopted could be MIL-STD-461E [14], which documents the 
EMI requirements for a wide range of applications, from trucks to ships to aircraft to 
fixed installations, not to mention the different requirements within an application (e.g., 
above deck and below deck on a Navy ship). Although most weapon systems are 
compatible with MIL-STD-461E, it does not necessary imply that they can ‘co-exist’ 




In most situations, the high transmission power of the ship’s radar system will 
burn out most electronics within its arc of scanning. Thus, it is important to consider the 
location of ammunition storage onboard as well as the position of launchers with respect 
to the radar transmission area of arc during integration review meetings to ensure and 
determine the best course of action to minimize such interference either through design or 
by procedural means. 
2. Operational Profile of Large-scale Systems Integration 
In general, this aspect is unique to each country’s armed forces’ operational 
concept and war-fighting procedures. Hence, this is very dependent on the nature and 
environment with which the systems are interfaced based on the desired operation needs. 
One example is a network connection via Ethernet or dedicated point-to-point 
connection. In most situations, these connections will be dependent on how the 
Command and Control (C2) system is to be implemented. In the case example of the 
Harpoon Weapon System, one possible scenario is to interface with the C2 in a network 
Ethernet, but with the critical ship’s position and dynamics data (roll, pitch, yaw) directly 
connected to the ship’s Inertial Navigation System (INS). With better understanding of 
the various critical connections and the nature of the backbone and supporting network 
architecture adopted, it will then be possible to analyze all safety critical events that could 
lead to undesired consequences; an example is an inadvertent launch of missile during 
engagement or engaging the wrong target. 
3. Structural Integrity 
This is a safety study on all physical integration of the systems with the 
interfacing platform. In general, the interfacing platform will have a set of operational 
requirements to meet. For example, in the case of a typical warship, it will have the 
operational requirement that all systems aboard be survivable (able to sustain one 
underwater shock or explosion) up to sea state 7 and operational (ability to maintain self-
defense capability) up to sea state 5.  
In addition to these operational requirement considerations, the final design of the 




(EQT) reports obtained from various systems that will be interfaced onboard. As such, 
this is one area that needs to be sorted out as early in the life cycle as possible, so that 
adequate mechanical enhancements to either the platform or to the affected systems, such 
as additional shock mounts or steel reinforcement implemented on the deck or equipment 
end, could be finalized after successful integration design review.  
Another potential safety-critical pitfall to consider could involve a scenario 
whereby EQT report suggests that the Harpoon Weapon System launchers are able to 
sustain two consecutive hang-fires, meaning that the ignition chain and booster are 
activated, the missile fails to launch and a sustained plume from the booster occurs for a 
period of time. From the platform structure integrity point of view, it will be difficult to 
quantify and measure if such an event will cause any severe damage or deformation to 
the area around the launcher. 
Similarly, such critical events should be identified upfront so that further 
simulation studies or a land-based trial on a mock-up of the platform structure could be 
conducted to substantiate this safety critical event. Nonetheless, this is one area of 
platform safety information that will subsequently be propagated downstream into the 
O&S phase. Without such information being recorded, monitored and tracked effectively, 
it will be difficult for the logistics personnel to plan and prepare the necessary retrofitting 
requirements when the ship and/or weapon system reaches the milestone for mid-life 
upgrade or major overhaul. 
C. SAFETY TO PERSONNEL 
This final area of safety focus concentrates on the day-to-day handling and 
operation of the systems by trained operators. It should primarily cover potential safety 
hazards to the personnel such as electromagnetic radiation, high voltage electric shocks 
and explosives safety. 
1. Radiation Hazards (RADHAZ) 
RADHAZ describes the hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuel, electronic 




area of operation of the platform based on certain pre-determined frequency and power 
density ranges. With reference to military context, in accordance to Navy regulation 
NAVSEA OP3565/NAVAIR 16-1-529 [19 and 20], these hazards are segregated as 
follows: 
 Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Personnel (HERP) 
 Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) 
 Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuel (HERF) 
The main reason that this particular safety study is categorized under safety to 
personnel is the fact that personnel are more vulnerable to these electromagnetic radiation 
hazards. It literally means that the consequences of HERO and HERF, such as electrical 
current surge and fire, impose danger to the platform as well as to the personnel. In the 
context of large-scale systems integration, especially with systems containing explosives 
and fuel contents, it is thus important to conduct a RADHAZ mapping on the interfacing 
platform.  
The result of the RADHAZ mapping not only sectorizes the safety boundaries on 
the platform but also determines the level of risks associated with the total number of 
hazards onboard. This information will further aid the end user in defining and refining 
his operational profile as well as ensuring that procedures are in place to adequately 
address all these safety concerns. 
2. Ammunition Stowage and Onboard Storage Hazards  
This is considered to be one of the major safety concerns in the assessment, as this 
safety event will potentially impact both the platform and its personnel. Basically, this 
safety event analysis should cover all aspects of ammunition handling, which first include 
loading and unloading of ammunition onboard the platform and a review of the 
maximum height of the ammunition storage in the event of accidental drop (this needs to 
be correlated to the All-Up round drop tests qualified, for example, up to forty feet height 
with respect to the waterline). With this information gathered, it will then be easier to 
devise the plan and procedure to conduct loading and unloading operations with detailed 




Once ammunition is loaded and stored onboard, another factor to consider will be 
the quantity and arrangement of this ammunition with respect to other potential 
ammunition mixes onboard. This leads to another factor to consider in terms of Net 
Explosive Quantity (NEQ), also known as net explosive content (NEC) or net explosive 
weight (NEW) [17]. It is defined as the total mass of the contained explosive substances, 
without the packaging, casings and bullets and includes the mass of the TNT equivalent 
of all contained energetic substances. This is clearly one of the most critical safety events 
to consider in detail as the consequences of inadvertent mass detonation of ammunition 
onboard will be catastrophic.   
D. SAFETY TEMPLATE OPTIMIZATION 
When there are two or more integrated weapon systems, there is high possibility 
of overlapping weapon damage areas or what is sometimes known as a violation of 
weapon safety template of boundaries. In general, the safety template for each weapon or 
missile is generated or derived based on its associated guidance error as well as other 
environmental and weapon system consideration. Similarly, these safety templates are 
again generated based on certain assumptions on the area of operations for the country of 
origin. Therefore, from the perspective of a COTS/NDI user, there could be further 
environmental constraints and operational usage that are different from the assumptions 
used in the safety template generated. 
As such, having a clear safety template for each weapon system within the large-
scale systems integration will be important in further determining and optimizing the 
overall large-scale systems safety template. In addition, adherence to the safety template 
usually requires that certain instrumentation and tracking equipment be in place, such as 
telemetry equipment, chase aircraft and radar tracking. Therefore, by having a clearer and 
detailed knowledge of the safety template assumptions for each weapon and missile 
concerned, both the environment and the resources could all be better optimized for 
subsequent OT&E live firing events, which will usually mark an important milestone in 




E. PROPOSED HAZARD LIST TABLE  
Based on the above three focus areas, a proposed layout of a hazard list table is 
described below, with the intent to be able to capture, monitor and trace all safety hazards 
identified and mitigated throughout the large-scale systems integration life cycle. Using 
the case example of the SSM System (with Harpoon Weapon System as the lead system), 
a detailed process of creating this hazard list table is described as follows. 
1. Case Example of Safety Assessment of SSM System 
From the perspective of a FMS customer, as highlighted earlier the Harpoon 
Weapon System (HWS) will be procured as a COTS/NDI by foreign armed forces. 
Typically, as part of the FMS procurement, a safety assessment report for the HWS will 
be delivered. A summary of the total number of residual risks associated with a 
standalone Harpoon Weapon System will be provided in the report. For example, there 
could be X number of Medium risks and Y number of Low risks after safety mitigation 
factors have been implemented into the design of the system. Table 5 shows an example 
of a particular safety related hazard identified in the Harpoon Weapon System (HWS) 
Safety Report [23]. 
 
Table 5.   Examples of Residual Risks from HWS Safety Report 
S/N Hazard Description Residual Hazard Risk Index Mitigation Considerations 
1 Inadvertent Launch of Missile Low 
Missile can only be launched with a 
valid engagement sequence (Safety 
chain design) 
2 
Electrocution due to 
Multiple Sources of 
Power Supply  
Medium Electric signage on key sub-systems to indicate high voltage hazard 
 
As shown in the above table, there are substantial details that are missing in the 
summary report, such as the causes of the hazard described, the initial risk when this 
hazard was identified and any known cases of mishap due to these hazards. In most cases, 




through the evolution of several system upgrades. Given such constraints and the 
unknown safety-related problems associated with the weapon system when it is to be 
integrated on a different platform with different interfacing systems and operating profile, 
it is important to begin the hazard identification as early as possible in the Integration 
Design Review (IDR) phase of the COTS/NDI system life cycle, as highlighted in Figure 
11 of Chapter III. 
From the safety report provided by the Harpoon Weapon System OEM, the IPMT 
can then initiate the hazard identification as per the functional hierarchy in Figure 14. By 
considering the three main focus areas described earlier in this section, a SSM System 
Safety Assessment can be generated as shown in Table 8. With reference to Table 8, 
considering first the aspect of safety to interfacing platform, the first safety event 
identified shows that the main mitigation measure to take was procedural control. This in 
turn had certain implications for the operational readiness of the platform.  For example, 
each time during launch the radar had to be ‘switched off’ or ‘blinded’ at certain angles 
or sectors due to the possibility of ‘zapping’ the missile prior to launch.  This implies that 
the ship may be limited in self-defense capability during a SSM engagement, which may 
not be acceptable to the users. Hence, trade-off analysis or further mitigation measures 
will need to be studied in order to address the operational aspects in relation to this safety 
event. 
The next two safety event examples from Table 8 (S/N 2 & 3 of safety to 
interfacing platform) described another situation that could possibly occur at different 
phases of the life cycle. This situation concerns the possibility that there are multiple 
causes and affected systems associated with a single safety event. In such cases, the 
safety event should then be broken down in accordance with the affected systems and the 
different permutations or a series of procedures or operation actions that could lead to the 
same hazard occurrence. Similarly, the same safety event could be first identified at the 
IDR stage based on a known series of operations leading to this event, and then during 
testing phase, the same safety event could occur again but due to another set of 




and procedures that could lead to the same safety event in the safety hazard table, and 
then analyze and mitigate each permutation independently.  
The final safety event in the safety to interfacing platform area described one 
situation whereby the structural integrity of the platform and the launcher could be 
compromised due to the possibility of a hang-fire situation. A certain level of 
qualification tests on the launcher could have been concluded by Boeing to be able to 
withstand the plume for a certain duration. However, there could be uncertainty with 
regard to the structural integrity of the platform in this aspect. Cost will be the main 
driving factor in determining whether a concise assessment of this safety event could be 
performed. While simulation analysis could be the most logical and economical approach 
to take, it will still pale in comparison to performing a mock-up trial for this safety event 
to find out the actual impact on the platform.    
In the next area of safety assessment on personnel, the example provided in Table 
8 again shows that a safety event (inadvertent launch) could happen in different modes of 
the system, such as operational mode versus maintenance. Again, as explained in earlier 
paragraphs, it is highly recommended to create and assess the effect of different system 
modes on the same safety event independently. The final safety event in this area was 
taken directly from the hazard list provided by the OEM as shown in Table 5, above. It is 
noted that this safety event actually remains exactly the same from its original safety 
report by OEM as there are no further mitigation measures that could further reduce this 
risk to a lower level. 
The safety assessment for the SSM System described above is an iterative process 
until all hazards have been determined to be mitigated to a practically reasonable low 
residual risk. In most cases, this iterative safety assessment will continue until the system 
successfully completes the OT&E and in preparation to obtain approval from the end 
users. A typical summary of all residual risks for the SSM System case example may 
look like Table 6. A total of 3 Medium and 37 Low residual risks have been identified 




Some conclusions that could be drawn when acquiring final approval from the 
stakeholder include consideration of the severity of the Medium residual risks combined 
with their relatively low frequency of occurrence. Therefore, the risks are assessed to be 
contained and localized with proven mitigation measures put in place. On the other hand, 
it is also important to take note of the high number of Low residual risk with high 
frequency of occurrence (Occasional or higher). Although these are the non-significant, 
non-life threatening safety hazards, they could result in a certain level of operational 
readiness discomfort if the personnel overlooked these details in day-to-day operations. 
 
Table 6.   Case Example Summary for SSM System Residual Risks 
Severity Frequency of 
Occurrence Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible 
Frequent - - - - 
Probable - - - - 
Occasional - - - 18 
Remote - 2 - 19 
Improbable 1 - - - 
 
The case example used in this section showed the effectiveness of the safety 
hazard table in generating, maintaining and tracking all safety events relating to the large-
scale systems integration. It is structured with the concept of making it easy to understand 
for all parties involved, but yet the detailed information collection and analysis to be 
conducted proved to be the key factors in ensuring that a thorough system safety 
assessment is performed. 
 
 
Table 7.   Proposed Hazard List Table 
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Table 8.   Case Example of SSM Weapon System Safety Hazard Table 
SAFETY TO INTERFACING PLATFORM 
S/N Hazard Description Affected Systems Initial Hazard Risk Index 
Life Cycle 





1. Electronics burn-out due to EMI from radar 
Harpoon Weapon 
System (HWS) Low-Medium IDR 
a. Procedural Control (prevent radar operation 
during missile launch) 
 
b. Conduct EMI testing onboard to determine 
area to sector out during launch. 
Low ICIT Operational Impact 
 HWS, C2 system Low-Medium IDR 
a. The system design had implemented 
adequate safety interlocks that prevent this 
event from occurring.  
 
b. Test cases related to this event are 
thoroughly tested during Integration Testing, 
FAT and ICIT with no abnormalities observed. 
Low ICIT  
2. 
Inadvertent Launch of 
Missile 
(Operational) 
Ship Power Supply 
to Launcher Medium IDR 
a. Procedural Control (Do not connect ignition 
cable prior to firing) Low FAT  
3. 
Engage Wrong Target 
– Different Target 
numbering reference 
between HWS and C2 




a. Show both C2 Target Number and HWS 
Track number in one Tactical Picture 
 
b. Test cases to be implemented in FAT, 
Integration Tests and ICIT 
Medium ICIT  
4. 
Impact of Sustained 
Booster Plume due to 
hang-fire on platform   
HWS launchers, 
deck area Medium IDR 
a. Simulation runs and  
mock-up trials to determine weak links in the 
platform and launcher 
 
b. Inspection of Launcher and platform after X 
number of launches 
 
c. Implement local reinforcement 
Medium ICIT  
SAFETY TO PERSONNEL 
S/N Hazard Description Affected Systems Initial Hazard Risk Index 
Life Cycle 





1. Electric Shock 
Harpoon Weapon 
System, Ship Power 
Supply 
Medium IDR a. Electric signage on key sub-systems to indicate high voltage hazard Medium IDR  
2. 




System, C2 system Medium IDR 
a. Procedural Control (Do not connect ignition 








VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 A.  GENERAL GUIDELINES PROPOSED 
This thesis explored the current gaps and potential pitfalls in formulating the 
system safety assessment for large-scale systems integration, particularly on using and 
interfacing multiple COTS/NDI systems to fulfill the intended operational requirements. 
In summarizing the findings gathered in this research, the following guideline and/or 
checklist attempt to provide a quick overview and template necessary in order to kick-
start the system safety assessment. 
1. Determining the Lead System Safety Assessment (aka System 
Integrator) 
In order to fulfill the need for a joint weapon safety oversight, it is important first 
to identify which sub-system within the large-scale systems integration will be the lead 
system. However, in most cases the logical candidate for the lead system is the weapon 
system, if it is the only weapon system within the large-scale systems integration. This is 
due to the fact that the weapon system as compared to other sub-systems, such as the 
command and control system and sensor system, poses more risks with higher hazard 
consequences. In contrast, this may not necessarily be true if there is more than one 
weapon system on multiple platforms within the large-scale systems integration.  
To complicate the situation further, each weapon system has its own current 
stakeholder in their respective Services, as highlighted in Figure 12. It is therefore of 
utmost importance that the working group formation will involve all stakeholders 
concerned in the large-scale systems integration. All contributing factors and 
considerations should be put in place in determining the lead system role collectively.  
2. Review of Safety Assessment Matrices 
Due to the complexity of the large-scale systems integration of COTS/NDI, there 
could be a possibility that the Probability of Occurrence in the safety matrix of all the 




MIL-STD-882 as adopted by DoD should be used as much as possible. However, as the 
probability of occurrence is somehow related to the operational profile/usage determined 
by different nation’s armed forces, there could be further need to look into the system 
usage in detail and possibly tailor the MIL-STD-882 to suit individual operational 
requirements. Similarly, the working group for the system safety assessment will provide 
the right environment and proper guidance in deciding on the eventual risk matrix 
adopted for the large-scale systems integration. 
3. Incorporating Adequate Testing for All Safety Critical Events 
Once the initial table of hazard lists is generated during the Integration Design 
Review stages in the System Acquisition Management phase (refer to Figure 11), it is 
appropriate to begin to prepare and formulate the test plan for all safety critical events 
identified. As highlighted in this research, the main mitigation factor for ensuring safety 
for COTS/NDI systems is to plan and perform more testing before system fielding and 
operation. Progressive testing should be recommended and incorporated between the 
Factory Acceptance Tests (FATs) and ICIT, as referenced in Figure 11.  
Additionally, because of the complexity in the large-scale systems integration, it 
is beneficial to set up a laboratory test-bed for integration testing. This should ideally be 
done before the FATs and after the Final Integration Design Review (FIDR) is 
completed. Therefore, all safety critical test cases can adequately be created and tested in 
a controlled environment before deploying the system for field use and trials. Successful 
completion of this Integration testing phase not only enhances confidence in the systems 
but also provides all parties with a reference point and minimum threshold level in terms 
of the system safety readiness before embarking on the subsequent phases. 
As the systems go through the Transition to O&S phase of the life cycle, there 
could be additional integration problems as well as safety-related issues. The laboratory 
test bed created in the earlier phase will come in handy, as it provides a good avenue to 






aid further testing and analysis of the problem. Once again, all this information and safety 
related problems are logged and traced throughout the life cycle within the hazard list 
table (refer to Table 5) generated earlier. 
With all these measures and the necessary tools available, a certain level of 
confidence could be achieved leading up to the OT & E milestone. Generally, live firing 
test(s) will be planned at the end of this OT & E phase. The successful completion of the 
live firing test(s) will provide a better indication to all stakeholders that the system is safe 
for operational use. In addition, the completion of this milestone further assures that the 
system safety related information and process have been put in place such that it can be 
continued to be monitored and traced in the subsequent phases of the system’s life cycle 
until it is retired, disposed of or undergoes further upgrades. 
B.  CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
This thesis research successfully identified the current gap in system safety 
assessment for large-scale system integrations, especially in the area of COTS and NDI 
systems integration. A tailored COTS/DNI system integration life cycle process model 
was determined by referencing the DoD system life cycle process. With this process 
model created and using a case example of SSM System architecture with the Harpoon 
Weapon System (HWS) as the lead system, a system safety functional hierarchy was 
produced. Finally, on the basis of the functional hierarchy, three areas of focus for an 
effective safety assessment were identified, namely safety to interfacing platform, safety 
to personnel and safety template optimization.  
While current DoD policy considers a joint weapon system safety review board 
essential, an important further recommendation is to identify the need for an IPMT, as 
well as a working group, that are essential to oversee the task of safety assessment of 
large-scale cross-service safety events. A potential pitfall identified in this aspect of 
multiple system integration is to determine a lead system that will have the overall 
responsibility to prepare and appraise the end users of the final residual risks for the 
entire large-scale systems integration. Usually, this lead role is taken up by the weapon 




However, in the event of multiple weapon systems available within the large-scale 
systems integration, a collective decision making method could be used. 
Finally, a hazard list table was proposed as a tool to be used in relation to the 
system safety assessment functional hierarchy so as to achieve the objective to identify, 
mitigate, trace and accept all residual risks associated with the large-scale system 
integration throughout its life cycle. A case example of the SSM System safety 
assessment on a ship platform was used to further explain the usage and process of 
generating, maintaining and tracking the hazard list table. 
System Safety assessment is very difficult. Without a concise process and 
architecture as a baseline, it is nearly impossible to conduct effectively a system safety 
assessment for large-scale systems integration. The Hazard List Table format proposed is 
a useful tool and provides the necessary information and details necessary to be able to 
pull out any hazard identified, note when it was surfaced, target mitigation measures to be 
taken and finally identify the associated residual risk, at any phase of the large-scale 
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